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Typology in Development Theory: Retrospective and Prospects 
Gustav Ranis* 
I. Introduction 
Much of Hollis Chenery's professional life has been devoted to the 
investigation of differential patterns of growth in the developing w
orld • 
• If one traces the evolution of his and his-collaborators' work over
 the 
past two decades, it may be fairly characterized as starting with the
 
notion that there is a "typical" developing country whose exvected p
er­
formance over time can be captured by cross-sectional analysis acros
s all 
economies at varying levels of income--with deviations from this pat
tern 
to be explained by further analysis. From these beginnings it is cle
ar 
that Chenery's work has·beco_me increasingly sensitive to the need to 
disaggregate, certainly between developed and developing, but also.am
ong 
developing countries; increasingly modest in the extent of sectoral de
tail 
insisted on; and increasingly leery of attaching normative importan
ce to any 
Taking advantage of the accumulating·of the "average" patterns observed. 
.
record of more than three decades of post-war LDC growth-a laboratory . 
not available in the 50s and early 60s--Chenery has increasingly turned 
to the use .of the LDC historical laboratory as complementary to his 
initial cross~sectional analysis.
1 
. . 2 . 
In one senGe Simon Kuznets' work can-be characterized as closely 
related to that of Chenery and associatessthough it relies more heavily 
on 
.
the "eyeballing" of statistics in place of Chenery's more sophistica
ted 
*.Frank Altschul Professor of International Economics, Yale University. 
• The author wishes to acknowledge the ver:y helpful·comments of M. Syrquin. 
1 . . . 
Also infl~cnccd, of course, by.his work on individual LDC's, startin
g 
·with Southern Italy during the Marshall Plan days and including Israel, 
Turkey and Pakistan. 
2E.g. S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Grm~th: Rate, Structure and Spread,
 




regression analysis, and was, from the very beginning,more 
influenced by, as well as sensitive to, the potential r·ichness of his­
torical analysis, not only with respect to post-war LDC experience but 
also with respect to at least some now developed countries of Western 
Europe and, of course, Japan. Kuznets' main concern was that of under­
standing the transition from an epoch of agraria~ism to one of modern 
growth, with the evolution marked basically by changes in the composition 
of output among the three main sectors, A, M, and 5,as ,income increases. 
Bis interest in defining the main characteristics of modern growth,. 
1.ncluding the systematic application of science and technology, the 
~ . 
acceieration of growth, major structural change, and the diffusion of 
the process ac~oss countries, all led him to a strong early emphasis 
on the use of historical evidence and, over time, an increasing interest 
,-.·.·• ·1.n typological ditferences among countries, with respect, for ex3D;1ple, 
to country size and other differences in initial conditions. 
Other investigators, including Arthur Lewis, Fei/Ranis, Kelley/Williamson/ 
1 had a somewhat· different starting point, i.e. simple (orCheetham, 
uot so simple) two sector closed economy models, applied initially to 
the historical performance of a small set of now developed countries, 
conspicuou~ly England and Japan. Over time they moved out from there 
~o incorporating .various crucial_ open economy dimensions and widening 
the application to other contemporary LDC's, especiallY. members of the 
same sub-family or typology. Specifically, this school proceeded to examine 
the open economy development experience of the relatively small East 
Asian labor surplus developing countries, i.e. Korea and Taiwan over 
111»evelopment \:1th Unlimited Supplies of Labour," Manchester School, 
1954, Devclonrn~nt of the Labor Sur lus Economy: Theorv and Polic , 1964, 
Dualistic Ec0nor.,ic lJ~velopment Theorv anJ History, 197 
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three post-war decades and to contrast
 it with that of Japan after the 




the experience of members of this typo
logy wi~h otheISdiffering in 
i.nitia_l conditions, such as size, ext
ent of labor surplus, human and 
natural resource endowment etc. such 
as the Latin Atlerican and African 




cal analysis. It 
.
rejects the proposition tha.t every co
untry is sui 
. . generis and that its transition _growth experience thu
s defies generali­
But i~ is also skeptical of the effortzability and transferability. 
to extract general conclusions for g
rowth from the' flash bulb exposure 
of country data points •. .. 
We perceive a gradual convergence over tim
e between the rigorously 
·-econometric comparative patterns· app
roach of Chenery, on the one hand, 
·· and the more casually empirical .co
mparative historical analysis approac
h 
of the latter group, with Kuznets sta
nding somewhere in between from 
the very beginning. Both approaches 
<1im at the s~me objective: a better 
understa..~ding of the causes of and im
pediments to successful.growth in 
developing societies as well as of th
e reasons for inter-country diver­
gence of performance; and ultimately,
 of course, at isolating the element
s 
of non-transferability provided by the 
~tra~ghtjacket·of nature as well 
as the. hopefully substantial, eiements of transferability relating to
 : 
both the technical and political dimen
sions of the man.:made envi-roiuneut·. 
In what follows we tend to briefly pr
esent our own assessment of 
.die terrain these various groups of 
researchers have, i:,n. fact. been 
t~aversing,following parallel and, w
e believe, increasingly convergent 
paths over the past several decades. 
Second, we intend to examine the 
con­contrasting transition growth performance of three major types of 
temporary developing countries as a substantive demonstration of one of 
these paths. Finally, we intend to conclud~ with some reflections on 
what is likely to lie ahead in the continuing joint search for a richer 
.understanding and consequently better national and international policies. 
ZI. Convergent Approaches Outlined 
In order to make an intellectual point it is sometimes necessary 
to exaggerate. In this sense to call Hollis Chenery's earlier work 
strictly cross-sectional and the Lewis/Fei/Ranis/KelleyjWilliamson/Cheetham model: 
strict_ly historical is undoubtedly an exaggeration. In his "Patterns 
of Industrial Growth"1 {1960) Chenery· estimat~d the parameters of one 
average expansion path valid for all countr~es by regressing indicators 
of economic structure on per capita income and populatio~. Here the data 
set ~sed was purely cross-sectional, i.e. one observation for each country, 
. . 
.·. but we must reme~er the acute scarcity of LDC time series data at the time. 
Lewis/Fei/Ranis, on the other hand, make no use of economet~ics, use oniy 
time series data largely for such historically relevant DC cases as Japan, 
and are concerned mainly with such indicators as ·savings rates 
and the exhaustion of the labor surplus as criteria for successful development. 
Kelley/Williamson/Cheetham do use fairly sophisticated econometric 
analysis for Japan in ihe effort to project history backward. None of these . 
early approaches included a full_ treatment of the foreign sector • 
. In the later 60s, in "Development Patterns Among <;ountries and 
2
Over Time" (1968) Chenery, with Lance TayloJ;, for the first time fits a 
regression line to time series data plotted alongside those fitted to 
cross-sectional data. Also, much more attention is now paid to the 
role of international trade, as the share of primary exports versus 
manufacturing ex-ports in total exports becomes part of-the explanatory. -
1 .
American Economic Review. Vol. 50 .. Sentcmber.2Revici..• ot Economics and St~.:i=:ticc::: Vol_. 50, N9vember. 
. Whatever the intellectual point of dep
arture both approaches now 
clearly assume that there exists a mean
ingful family affinity among 
subsets of developing countries giving t
hem a certain uniqueness not 
necessarily shared by other LDCs ; the m
ost obvious example is the role 
of trade and other open economy dimensions 
in small vs. large countries; 
a less obvious example is the difference
 between a Japanese and a Spanish 
colonial heritage. Acceptance of such a
 typological approach does not 
connote a lack of awareness of the fact th
at even within any one sub­
f~mily there may, and usually do, exis.t 
important, instructive differences 
A really helpful typo!ogical approach, n
o
among individual countries. 
matter from what school it emanates, sho
uld help bring out in clear 
focus the important elements of family a
ffinity while not suppressing 
meaningful intra-family differences. 
More controversial is the question of w
hether or not differences 
~ 
in policy should be included as part of 
the typological· environment or 




of Development," Chenery developed a typo
logy of development patterns
. 
in 
which ~ransitional countries arc classifie
d according to identifiable 
development strategies, including primar
y specialization,_ balanced 
development, import substitution and ind
ustrial specialization. Countries' 
strategies are identified by ho.; far the
y deviate from the "normal" 
pattern established by the regression eq
uations, i.e. in terms ~f their 
trade orientation, production orientation
,. and other aspects of structure. 
1t is concluded that "the four basic pa
tterns observed here have their 
counterpart in the development plans and
 policies of the transitional 
countries" {p; 106). These strategies, 
it should be noted in passing, 
1Patterns of Development~ 1950-1970 {Londo
n: Oxford University Press). 
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consist in large part of trade-related policy alternatives. 
Simon Kuznets would have no difficulty in insisting•that discus­
sions ~f strategy or policy be kept out of any examination of the 
transition growth process based on the twin phenomena of differing 
initial conditions and different points of observation on structure 
over time. He would be content to observe a· r·elatiyely shrinking A 
sector. an expanding M sector and a fairly stable {if .markedly changing 
:ln composition) S sector in the course of developmen~and to analyze 
said structural changes as reflective of underlying changes in both 
final demand and capacity conditions. Deviations from the expected pattern 
of structural change under.growth would be largely attributed to dif­
ferences in the state of nature, i.e.· the objective economic environment. 
Unfortunately, however, in the real world. deviations from "norma1° 
behavior over time, in either direction; are not unrelated to whether 
-or not government policies in fact, serve to accommodate or to obstruct 
·underlying economic forces which may be at w~~k • 
.But even Kuznets, averse as he may be to the premature introduction 
of policy issues, is quite aware of the fact that the rapid structural 
,.shifts caused by the march of tech~ology change on the supply side, 
...as well as. Engel's Law on the demand side. are subject to breakdowns 
and conflicts among socio-economic groups. As he puts it, "if established 
groups attached to large economic sectors suffer or foresee contraction 
.· of their share or base in economic society••• they are likely to resist 
l
by u_sing political pressure to slow down the process." In the open . 
economy context this applies to the extent of resistance or accommodation 
·1
Simon Kuznets, "Driving Forces of Economic Growth: What can be 
Learned from History", Wcl t \..i.rtschaf tliches Arch iv, Vol. 116 • 1980 p. 419 •) 
• 
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given the pressures of a marching comparative advantage over the·long. 
term--which +s, in fact, closely related to the policy-tinged subphases 
as weof transition growth in the labor surplus open dualistic economy, 
shall see below. As Kuznets in the same context puts i~ "if these con­
flicts are to be resolved so as to preserve a suff~cient consensus for 
growth and change and yet not at a (prohibitive) cost some resolution 
1
mechanism is needed." If he is willing to reflect on the application 
of this conflict to a matter of war among nations he certainly should 
. . 
be willing to accept the mu·ch more modest notion that it is, in fact, 
the consensus about policy among various vested interest groups which 
determines which path the so~iety takes in the course of its transition 
growth effort. 
Adherents of .-the comparative histor.ical approach have incorporated 
the role of policies as endogenous variables into their more casual 
. . 
analytical framework. This is apparent, for example, in the 1980 Ranis 
paper "Challenges and Opportunities Posed by_Asia's Super•Exporters: 
Implications for Manufactured Exports from Latin American
2 as well as 
·in the forthcoming "Economic Development of Korea, Taiwan and Japan in 
. . . . 3 
· Historical Perspective" by Ohkawa, Fei and Ranis a product of the· so-
called C~mparative Analysis Project. Phasing in the Fei/Ranis tradition 
seeks to answer essentially the same question as Chenery and Kuznets, 
· i.e. how are pt·oductivity gaint and increments in domestic and fore:ig!l 
demilnd allocated among oectors as income rises and how. if at all. does the 
modus operandi of the system change. In that sense import substitution 
1 . 
Simon Kuznets, ~. 
. 2In Export Diversification nnd the New Protectionism edited by 
W. Baer and M. Gillis, NBER, 1981. 
•
3to be published, 1983. 
may be viewed as a temporary, if impo
rtant,aberration from nee-classical 
equiiibrium, with the dimension of op
enness explicitly introduced, but 
its importance differing with country 
size and other facets of the initial
 
Sectors are not homogeneous in the in
put­
endowment. But there is more. 
Moreover,
output tradition and do not necessar
ily interact smoothly over ti.me. 
are id~ntified and deployed analytic
ally-with
transition subphases 
the crucial political economy decisio
ns labor surplus systems face 
at the inevitable termination point o
f their primary import substitu-
tion subphase, i.e. whether to ~ursue
 secondary import substitution 
immediately or only after having mov~
d successfully through a labor 
Once again-we maym.:ote that
intensive export substitution subpha
se. 
.trade policy seems to be a key elemen
t. 
_There is, of course, another strand of
 Chenery's work which also 
explicitly evokes the use ·of phases bas
e~ on changes in the societal 
;.·... · 
1n his 1966 article with Alan
• capacity to accomplish certain ~as
ks. 
Strout "Foreign Assistance and Econom
ic Development
111 Chenery identifies 
development phases according to the co
nstraints ~hich are binding in 
the context o.f a simple dynamic mode
l, moving from the ability to. 
blueprint, to the ability to save, to
 the ability to.export competi-
. tively as a society continues to matu
re. Unfortunately", mo.st of the 
attention here has been focused on th
e two-gap approach cross-sectionally
, 
with relatively less follow-up on the s
equent~lly changing nature of 
the constraints in the context of a singl
e.historical case such as 
Thus there has never been
Pakistan's, !ocussed on in the origina
l article. 
.a Teal wedding between Chenery's pattern
s.approach and his two-gaps 
Yet it is not a far cry from equating both the savingsapproach. 
1·
~. 1966, Vol. 56, September. 
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constrained phases (i.e. the blue-printing c~n
straint as well as the 
· ability to save constraint) as tantamount to-
.early primary import 
substitution., with the export constrained phase 
reminiscent of '\:he" choice 
when primary import substitution runs 
..
out of steam, 
The notion of transition growth which we·adhere
 to, and will try 
to further illustrate in this paper. accepts an
 e~olutionary or meta­
morphic view of economic development, i.e. it e
nvisions the existence 
of subphases in the course of the transition pro
cess for each of the 
major fypes of developing countries, with eac
h 
subphase characterized by a distinct set of str
uctural characteristics 
and a distinct mode of operation. By this we d
on't mean to imply any 
along a· fixed historical patternsense of the inevitability of movement . 
but, instead, to make an empirical observation w
ith respect to the 
evolutionary phenomena observed in some of the 
major typological cases around 
the world-ei~her with respect to the piles of 
behavior within one typology or 
The evolution from one sub­
with resp_ect to contrasts among families of ..LDC' 
s. 
phase to another is related ·both to cumulative c
hanges in the fundamental internaJ 
conditions within each system and the presence 
or absence ·pf ~ccomodating policy 
. adjustments. 
III. A ~rief De~onstration of the Cooparative 
Historical Analysis 
Approach 
Let us briefly compare the development record to date 
of three. 
Kenya, representing thecountries representing three distinct types: 
t'elatively l11nd.. surplus. natural resources rich
. human resources defi­
cient or "African type"; Mexico, representing t
he moderately labor 
•urplus, relatively natural resources and human
 resources rich, 
• 
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"Latin American type"; and Taiwan, repre
senting the heavy labor surplus, . 
relatively natural resources poor, human
 resources rich, "East Asian type." 
. Ve could spend a good deal more time i
n spelling out these dimensions of 
the differences in the so-called initia
l conditions, the precise degree 
of labo~ surplus measured by man/land ra
tios; the human capital endo~"IIlent 
measured by literacy or educational atta
inment ra~es, the natural resources 
endowment measured by the relative avai
lability of exportable minerals 
or cash crops (see table 1). 0thers,-e.g
: size, with Taiwan and Kenya 
. . 
fairly small, and Mexico somewhat interme
diate--could well be added, 
leading to a large potential number of typ
ological~cells; but this is not 
Rather, we want _to·demonstrate our appr
oach
our basic purpose here. 
at a rather elementary level in applica
tion to these three country type 
representatives. 
The beginning of the transition growth e
ffort is set rather arbitrarily 
at the point when the system moves out 
from its'coloniaf'pattern during 
which it ·exports mainly primary produc
ts in return for the import of consumer 
-uon-durables, deployed to· a·ttract worke
rs into the export enclave, as 
well as capital goods deployed to permit 
the expansi~n of 'the export enclave. 
The next subphase almost invariably con
stitutes an effort at primary 
.import substitution, _once the newly indep
endent country is-able to get 
-control of its foreign exchange .earnings_ supplemented by foreign cap
ital. 
The·beginning of the transition period
 has thus been placed around 1960 
. 1 
given the
for Kenya, shortly before independence; in 1
930 for Mexico, 
fact that independence there occurred much 
earlier and that the Great 
Depression gave a tremendous impetus 
to import substitution; 
1though the process actually can be said to hav
e _begun as far back 
as 1880. 
and around 1952 for Taiwan after both retrocession fr.om Japan and poli­
tical separation from the Mainland. According to table 1 Kenya ~y be 
characterized as small in size, intermediate in labor surplus, poor in 
human capital and poor in natural resources. The Latin American type, 
Mexico, may be viewed as intermediate in size, low in labor surplus, low 
in human capital and rich in natural resources; finally the East Asian 
type, Taiwan, is ~mall in size, heavy in labor surplus, rich in human 
· capital, and poor in natural resources~ 
All this, incidentally, is somewhat reminiscent of Chenery's typo-
logy once again, certainly ~"ith respect tn country size. as he includes 
·· all systems with a 1965 population in excess of 15 million. It is less 
clear for the differentiation between his small,primary oriented and his . . . 
small,industry oriented cases which are demarcated by differences in 
countries' actual export patterns and the· average pattern predicted 
for its size and income level. However, this difference is intended 
as an indirect measure used in .the "absence of satisfactory direct 
measures of ti~tural resource endowment, "l(Chenery 1979, p. 22), and Chenery 
·is fully·a~are that he is here using an endogenous result of resource 
endowments rather than the endm.nnents themselves which indeed means 
• 2 
that his typology is "more directly linked to goverr.ment policies" (Chenery 
1979, p.22). A fuller differentiation between skilled and unskilled lab~r 
. . 
as.well as between land and exportable natural resources would certainly 
. 
have been helpful and prevent the possibility of a small country switching 
3
from one Chenery type to another simply as a result of government policy change. 
:1 
· Structural Change and Deve1opment Policy (New York, Oxford University Press: 
2Ibid. 
3-
For example, Kenya changes it classification from "small primary 
oriented" in (Chencry and Taylor 1968) to_ "small industry . . 
oriented" in (Chenery and Syrquin 1975), reflecting the fact that the 
1968 paper consisted entirely of pre-independence observations, still with­
in the colonial structure, ~hile the data sets for the 1975 book contained 
a number of observations from the beginning of Kenya's transition ~hen 
Kenya had already moved into the primary import substitution subphase. 
Notice {figure ·1., row 1) that in 
the three countries under t')bser­
vation we find that, during the co
lonial or pre-transition.era,.the
 
of t·agricultural sector A is exportin
g traditional raw materials or m
ineral products, 
~a• to the foreign country F, and 
importing producer goods, Mp, for 
the expan~ion/ 
to the 
enclave, along with manufactured co
nsumer non-durables, MCN' consume
~in addition/ 
Export
domestically produced food, Df, 




may, of course, be supplemented b
y "private" foreign capital-
.Japanese foreign capital in the 
case of Taiwan, U.S. f_oreign capital in 
1 
the case of M~xico, and British fo
reign capital in the case of Keny
a. 
'The policy setting to sustain th
is modus operandi of the economy
 during 
the pre-independence or colonial period in 
all three country cases 
.includes an industrial policy sp
ecifying the role of domestic in
dustry 
within the colonial system, with 
minimal infant -industry- protecti
on 
-outside those narrow bounds and mo
st colonial investments focussed 
on 
. . 
~erbeads and services to facili
tate the .raw material or cash cr
op 
.export. 
ot course there also exist major differences 
not unrelated.to the. 
colonial heritage among the_ three
 countries during this pre-trans
ition 
°))base. Partsof the "initial con
ditions" are indeed related. to the parti-
-cular type of colonial master expe
rienced, i.e. the commodity cont
ent 
- :of the traditional ·exp~rt Xawhich
 is indeed not unrelated· to what
 the 
In the Kenya case
--colonial.power is basically inte
rested in procuring. 
consisted mainly of cash crops pr
oduced on large plantations, lea
ding
.:%a . . 
.to a dualistic division of sector
 A into a ~lantation sector owne
d by 
•~on-Africans producing cash crop
s for export and a smallholder s
ector 
·G01J!inated by Africans producing 





i.e. ve do not wish to emphasize 
the balanced trade aspects of 
In fact, net investment: or repat
riation of
the colonial situation. 
foreign capital es_s,gntially depen
d . on the relative ra_tes of retu
rn in 
the mother country and/or other 
colonies•. 
-14-
In the Mexican case X
a 
consisted mostly of minerals and raw materials 
again requiring access to international markets, with fairly capital 
intensive techniques of production in vogue, along with a food producing 
domestically oriented·agricultural sector•.1 The attention of agricul-
tural research as well as of infrastructural investments such as ports, 
• railways etc. by colonial and early post-coloniai governments in both 
Kenya and Mexico-was thus focussed in support-of traditional cash crop 
exports. In contrast, Japan was almost entirely interested in food 
production, and Taiwan's exports of rice and sugar were certainly instru-
111E!!1;a1 in focussing Japanese attention on the provision of small-scale 
rural infrastructural investments, such as irrigation, roads, and elec­
tricity as :well as an empha.sis on organizational innovations such as
._land reform,_as early as 1905, and the creation of farmers' associations. 
This helped prevent both the development of a dualistic agriculture 
and an undue "separation" between agricultur:e and nonagriculture as 
-well as .to set the stage for a dynamic rural economy at a later point 
1n time. 
~e initial transition subphase (row 2 in figure 1) almost uni­
versally adopted in contemporary LDCs, is that of primary import 
substitution ·(PIS). Using the whole arsenal o~ ?olicies by now too.
well known to require enumeration--all inten~ed to protect and support 
the new infant industrial class--public policy effected the gradual 
displacement of the previously imported non-durable consumer goods, 
MCN. by the domestically produced variety, De~• i~ all three cases 
~exico had also historically been producing some food for exporton a large scale latifundia basis in the North. 
-15-
under discussion. Xa 
continues to fuel the process, with the foreign 
exchange earnings now, however, used to import the
 producers' goods, 
M,p nee
ded for the construction of the ~ondurable consum
er goods indus­
tries in the newly important non-agricultural sec
tor NA. This description 
. 1 
corresponds rather closely to what Chenery (1979, 
p. 29) calls the early 
·• 
phase of the transition "characterized by the empha
sis on primary 
. exports, easy import substitution, and the availa
bility of external aid 
on soft terms." 
llllile these rough outlines of the primary import s
ubstitution sub­
phase are equivalent in.all three country cases, we may note one d
iffer­
This relates to the fact that Me~ico was already 
importing
ence as well. 
basic foodstuffs at this stage, Mr while, in the casES of both Keny
a and . 
Taiwan, domestic food production remained more than su
fficient to satisfy 
· domestic household requirements~ This difference
 is related to the fact 
that, in the ~ase of Taiwan, primary import substitution
 was of the "mild
11 
variety, i.e., while it adhered to the "package" P.
,reviously referred to, 
the extent of protection of the industrial sector 
via. ta.riff, exchange 
rate, and interest rate policies,as well as distor
tions of the terms of 
_ trade against the agricultural sector,were milder 
as compar~d to the 
typical LDC case.- In the instance of Kenya, on the othe
r hand, because 
·of a relatively small population on relatively _abundant land1 foo~ was 
still sufficiently plentiful, at least in t?is early 
phase of transiti~n. -
growth, to avoid the need to import from abroad. 
We can observe the progress of primary import sub
stitution, PIS, 
during this initial subphase by calculating the r
atio of the value of 
MCN to the value of total merchandise imports. M, ove
r time, as DCN 
gradually replaces MCN (see table 2); we may note that this ratio had 
already reached a low level plateau for Mexico by 1950, "indicating that 
the i~evitabie termination of this subphase with the. exhaustion of 
domestic markets had already been reached; Taiwan was nearing the com­
pletion of this subphase in the early 1960s, i.e. after..:about a decade; 
• and Kenya seems to be nearing the point of ·comple~ing it at this stage. 
It is worth noting that the time between the beginning of the transition 
effort and the completion of this first transition subphase was apparent-
ly longer for Mexico than for Kenya or Taiwan; this is probably due to 
the fact that it takes longer to saturate the dom~stie markets of some-
what larger countries, but undoubtedly also relates to the"telescoping" 
phenomenon, i.e. the attempted acceleratipn of countries by vintage, i.e. late-
. 
late comers are in an 
. 
even greater hurry-even for equivalent changes in per 
capita income-than late-comers,~ effect lIIOSt noticeablewheri we compare con-
temporary LDCs with such a case as nineteenth century Japan.
1 
The comparative performance of the thre~_countries under observation 
. . 
during this PIS subphase can be best judged by examining tables 3, 4 and 
S for Kenya, Mexico and Taiwan, respectively. In spite of Kenya's higher 
savings and investment rates {rows. 3 and 4) we may note that she has, thus f~r 
at· least,_achieved a much lower rate of per capita income growth (row 1) during 
this subphase than did Taiwan. Moreover, she has reached only a much lower 
level of labor force reallocation from agriculture to nonagriculture (rol1 2) 
than either Mexico or Taiwan. Both these dimensions of her relatively 
1see Fei, Ohkawa and Ranis, "Economic Developl!lent of Korea. Taiwau_ 
and Japan in Historical Perspective," Comparative Analysis Project, to be publ. lS 
especially the sec~ion on'telescoping.' 
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worse performance were, of cou
rse, in large p~rt a function 
of 
combined with an 
an initially quite poor human re
sources endo~ent 
When one adds to this, 
only moderately good natural res
ources endowment. 
over time, a relatively severe n
eglect of a potentially produ
ctive food 
_producing agricultural sector
 in the context of-maintaining
 an extensive 
slash-and-burn type of cultiva
tion, as well as a relatively 
high population growth 
rate threatening to substantiall
y increase her initially favc
rable 
man~land ratio,plus a rather c
apital intensive and inefficie
nt choice 
of industrial output and proces
s mixes, the conditions for an
 unfavorable 
"bottom line" are given. 
It is perhaps more inst~ctive
 to concentrate in what follow
s on 
the comparison between Mexico an
d Taiwan.· This is both becau
se of.Kenya's 
much later start--thus the more 
constrained historical labora
tory offered­
but also because of her overal
l less favorable initial cond
itions--espeoially 
in terms of her more constrain
ed industrial entrepreneurial
 capacity. During 
.... 
·their PIS subphase both Mexico 
and Taiwan did quite well in t
erms of 
the "bottom line'' indicator of g
rowth and quite poorly with re
spect 
While her growth performance h
as been relatively 
to income distribution. 
unsatisfactory, Kenya, on the 
other hand, seems to occupy a 
more 
favorable position with respec
t to income distribution,althou
gh the one 
year (1969) for which data are a
vailable does not pemit any v
ery strong 
Kenya is only now approaching 
the end of PIS when further
conclusion. 
industrialization must necessa
rily slow to die pace of popul
ation plus 
The significant divergence in 
the performance
per capita income growth. 
this historical point in time
. 
of Mexico and Ta5.wan took place
 only _·at 
Kenya may be well advised to an
alyze this divergence in terms
 of its own 
impending societal choice. 
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Once the initial subphase of transi
tion has run out of steam I.
I
developing countries indeed do have
 a rather momentous political deci
sion 
with respect to the choice of the s
econd sub-phase.
.
to make/ This is illustrated by th
e divergence between the Mexican an
d 
One possible strategy,
Taiwanese cases as illustrated in r
ow 3 of figure 1. 
adopted by Mexico (column 2), and ce
rtainly representing the majority 
LDC case, is to shift to a so-called 
secondary import substitution (SIS
) 
growth path. This basically means exte
nding the pre-existing import 
substitution policy syndrome,but no
w shifting the non-agricultural ou
tput. 
mix from non-durables to durables, 
capital g~ods·as well as the proce
ssing of raw 
materials (summarized as DCD), ~.e
. mov~ng into the more technology, 
capital and__ ~k~; 
intensive industrial activities, m
ainly directed towards the domestic
 
market. The shift to SIS production,
 i.e. from DCN to Den in ·figure·l, row 3, usuall 
indeed requires applying a. heavier 
dosage of the policy _package alrea
dy· 
in place,since the economy is now like
ly to be at a.still somewhat 
greater distance from its internatio
nal comparative advantage position
. 
While production ~s now more co~tly
 and capital in tensive, it neverthe
less
• 
permits a continuation of a rapid ra
te of industrialization while avoi
d­
ing a major restructuring of the policy
 regime·. 
As long as ample natural resource ex
ports continue to be available and
{or can b1 
supplemen·ted by fo:-eign cc:pital, th
is pattern can, and, in-most cases
, 1las been 
followed in the typical Latin Americ
an case,as well as ·els~where in th
e 
In more recent years such contJnucd 
pursuit of the
developing world. 
Jmport substitution policy regime ha
s been coupled with an~ effort 
. .
io export some of the same industrial goo
ds--which can; of course, be· 
accomplished only by vay of subsid
y-either provided directly by the 
_government or effected by dual pri
cing structures within firms subje
ct 
~ seco~d,increasingly pronounced,
to. government pressures (see below). 
casualty, of course, is the food pr
oducing agricultural sector which 
becomes even more neglected and dis
criminated against. In fact, we 
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may note an ever-increasing tendency to import food in Mex
ico, once a 
major grain exporter. 
The minority Taiwan case stands.in some contrast in the 
sense that 
the primary export substitution subphase (PES) chosen he
re at the con­
clusion of PIS basically consists of exporting into the 
international 
markets the same non-durable consumer goods previously s
upplied .only . 
to the domestic market, i.e. XCN (in row 3, c·olumn 3 of 
figure 1), while any consu: 
durables required for final consumption are likely to be
 mainly iluported (MCD). Th, 
successful penetration of international markets for non-
dur.able consumer 
goods is_usually accompanied by the gradual removal or a
t least reduction 
of.P.rotective devices favoring the new industrial.class 
so that domestic 
- prices can be brought i~to closer alignment with world
 prices. Trade 
regimes associated.with the PES growth pattern are subs
tantially .closer 
.to the free ~rade paradigm as industrial exports expand 
on the basis of 
a dynamically changing comparative advantage structure, with
 entrepreneurs,. 
having matured during the prior PIS period of infant ind
ustry protection,. 
·,increasingly in a position to take full advantage of the
 system's abun­
dant supplies of unskilled labor. 
The third transition subphase shown in row 4 follows mor
e or less 
naturally from the choice of the second subphase al1:eady
 discussed. It 
.is .fair to say that the objective of all develoj>ing cou
ntries i.s ulti-
.mately to produce for the domestic market, and to expor
t. a wide and increasingly 
In the case of Taiwan ~bis&OP,histicated range of industrial products. 
.is likely to represent a natural sequel to the primary exp
ort substitution 
pattern in the sense that, once the labor surplus has be
en exhausted, 
- ..v-
there is a natural tendency to shift towards the more capital and 
technology intensive product mixes for the domestic market and, 
given their relatively small size, to simultaneously,or at least-soon, also 
export such c.ommodities. Thus the extent of simultaneity of the SIS/ 
SES growth subphase is very much a function of the size of the domestic 
market; putting it another way, the length of the "tail" of the"flying 
geese"in a dynamic comparative advantage_Qr prQduct cycle setting
1 
depends on the 
size of the domestic market. It should also be not~d (see row 4 column 3) that 
essentially natural resources poor systems like Taiwan will ultimately be food 
. .
:lJDporters. 
The SIS/EP or export promotion growth path, in the case of Mexico, 
on ·the other hand (see ·figure 1, row 4, column 2),-is an indication 
of the aforementioned desire to export industrial manufactured goods 
even if the labor intensive industrial export- phase has been "skipped." 
The beginnings of this effort, especially after 1965, can be seen in 
table 4, row 9, indica-t:i.ng manufactured exports shifting upward sub­
stantially even as the overall export or·ientation-· remains 
steady or declines (see row 11). It is accomplished by 
superimposing industrial exports on the continued secondary 
:lJDport substitution structure of subphase two-which can be accomplished 
· ·only through the direct or indirect subsidization of such exports.• In 
contrast -to export substitution, export promotion is defined as the 
selective encouragement of particular industries or even individual 
• ·firms by administrative action in order to "push out" such exports in. 
the absence of a general decline in the level of protection or import 
liberalization. Such subsidization is achieved either by way of public 
sector fiscal measures,e.g. interest rate 4ifferentials, tax or tariff 
1 . .
See Raymond Vernon, "International lnvcstrent and International Trade 
:ln tbe Product Cycle, 11 ·Quarter1v·Journ:1l ·of ·Economics, May, 1966 •
. . 
- ....-
rebates, or,alternatively, by private se
ct.or· price discrimination forced 
.by the authorities which assure the same companies, in return, of.the retent
ion 
of large windfall profits in protected dome
stic markets. Increasing 
industrial export orientation in Mexico
 
is thus not caused by tQe product cycle evolut
ion resulting from increased 
. 
entrepreneurial maturation, increased int
ernational competitiveness, and 
the achievement of an end to the labor surpl
us condition but is ~he 
consequence of additional controls and i
ncentives planted "on top of" 
an existing import substitution superstr
ucture. At this level of aggre­
gation of industrial exports· it is, of cours





growth. When we decompose-manufacturing
 exports 
further, however, we find that, in 1970,
 20% of Mexico's total were in the 
consumer non-durablescategory, as compar
ed with 41% of Taiwan's.
1 
We must emphasize, ta.oreover, that the M
exican development path continues 
to be clearly much less export oriente4 o
verall and gives evidence of 
a much lower proportion of manufactured expo
rts than the Taiwan case-
.·. even if we concentrate on changes ove
r time rather than on· absolute 
levels-thus reducing the impact of diff
erences in country size. 
.ln summary, traditional exports
2, recently augmented by oil and 
alway~ by foreign c~pital, could continue
 to fuel the industrialization 
effort in.Mexico, including the export of fa
irly sophisticated capital 
In Taivan the burden of financing contin
ued industrial-
and consumer durables. 
• ization was, in-contrast, gradually shift
ed to non-durable consumer goods expor
ts 
during the crucial PES phase, thus getti
ng industry to increasingly help pay th
e Ye 
in the foreign exchange allocation sense-fo
r its own continued expansion. 
1i-ei, Ranis, Kuo, Gro~th With Equity: The Ta
i~an Case, Oxford 
University Press, 1979. 
2of which natural resources based tourism
 is an important component. 
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The evidence seems to support the notion that what
ever choice is 
made with respect to this second transition subphas
e usually also carries 
Both alternative sequences are covered,·implications for the third subphase.· 
without adequate differentiation, in what Chene_ry 
calls the "later phase" 
of_transition during which he notes "a shift to no
h-primary exports, 
second stage import substitution and e~temal borrowin







words, he does not dist:inguish between 
countries that adopt a strategy of "skipping" the n
on-durable consumer 
goods export subphase, i.e. the Latin American case,
 and those that. . 
move into the same sophisticated output and export mix
es by way of the 
Those whom Chenerylabor intensive phase, i.e. the East Asian case. 
-i.dentifies ex post as "industry specialization" ca
ses, bowev.er, generally seem to 
follow the East Asian sequence,·a~d countries ~e-atifi
ed ex. post as 
!'primary specialization" cases very often follow th
e :continued (secondary) 
import subs.titution path, for reasons already refer
red to. 
Differential growth performance but especially div
ergent employment 
and distributional outcomes largely resulting from
 these alternative 
. choices of transition growth must be noted -(see r
ow~ 1, 5 and 6 of .tables. 
It is true that the more equitable distribution ·of
 land at
4 and 5). 
But much
the outset was helpful on these scores to the Taiwan 
case. 
of .the differential in the level and trend of incom
e distribution ove~ 
tvo decades of fairly rapid growth in Mexico and v
ery rapid growth in 
'taiwan must be laid at the doorstep of the continued rel
ative neglect 
The gravi­
of agriculture and rural activities generally in Mexi
co. 
tational pull of policies away from food and toward
s export crops tended 
19P._ 1Ct. 
to make for lower labor intens
ities and a less favorable agr
icultural
.
we have th.e famous shift 
income distribution. By contr
ast, in Taiwan 
With respect to rural non­
from sugar to·mushrooms and aspar
agus. 
agricultural income,usually mo
re equally distributed than ag
ricultural, 
this constituted a very small p
roportion of Mexican rural inc
ome,in the 
vicinity of 10-15 percent, in c
ontrast to the 30-50 percent pl
us figures 
Moreover, given the continued 
maintenance and deepening of 
for Taiwan. 
the import substitution reg:ime
,both rural as well as urban in
dustry and 
servic_es are much more capital
 intensive and contribute much
 less to 
favorable employment and incom
e distribution outcomes as a c
onsequence. 
The labor share, urban and rur
al, in the typical iatin Amer
ican case 
range an~ falling over time, 
like Mexico is much lower, i.e.
 in the·.s 
when CQmpared with Taiwan and 
other East Asian cases where i
t is .6 to 
.J.and usually rising during the
 primary·export substitution p
hase. 
While we can't go into. detail he
re~ the functional distributio
n of 
. . 
income within each sector, alo
ng with the relative im~ortan
ce·of 
non-agricultural activities- in
.the rural areas, is an impor
tant deter~ 
. .1 
minant of the size distributio
n of income•. Consequently, i
ncome 
distribution equity improved t
hroughout the period under ob
servation 
1n Taiwan; what is· especially 
remarkable is the complete avo
idance of 
_the so-called U-~haped or Kuz
nets curve phenomerPnduring th
e PES 
sub~hase of the 1960's, the pe
riod of most rapid growth. and
 before 
the labor surplus had been fully
 exhausted. In fact, the comb
ination 
1See Fei, Ranis, Kuo, Grol.'th Wit
h Equitv: The Taiwan Case·,, Ox
ford 
-Un~versity Press,· 1979.for de
tailed theoretical as well as 
empirical treatment. 
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of early attention to agriculture, the shift towards more labor intensive 
crops within that sector. the importance of labor intensive rural indus­
try and service activities, and the relatively labor intensive output and 
. 
technology choices in the rest of the industrial sector all contributed to 
one of the best performances in terms of employment generation and income 
distribution equity anywhere in the developi~g world. This st~nds in 
some contrast to Mexico where underemployment was probably rising and 
. income distribution held at very poor levels, if not worsening, throughout 
the last two decades. 
We are, of course, entitled, in fact enjoined, to a_sk why such a 
deviation in pattern as between the East Asian and Latin American types, 
or, as Chenery 11t1.ght put it, why such a deviation of the "minority" East 
• Asian type from t~e "majority" ~tin American pattern approaching "average" 
regression performance. Partly, of course, our Latin American representa-
. . 
tive, Mexico, is substantially larger in size than our East Asian repre­
sentative, Taiwan; and, as we have already indicated, has a much lower 
level of labor surplus and a much better natural resource endowment. 
Consequently, even.if policies had been precisely identical in the two 
cases, we could anticipate a less pronounced an~ probably shorter primary· 
export substitution phase in the case of Mexico. given its generally 
higher levels of income and lo-wer levels of labor surplus. Its relatively 
stronger natural resource endowment. even before petroleum became 
_important, can be expected to yield a relatively stronger exchange rate 
and, by way of the so-callcd"Dutch disease." be less ·favorable for poten­
tial labor intensive manufacturing exports typical of the PES subphase. 
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.But,quite in addition to these endowment driven phenomena,are the 
package of policy interventions which further curbed any possible under­
lying tendency to move towards more diversified production and.exports 
by.way of the PES subphase. This set of policies or strategies are 
based, in part, on economic forces.but also;deeply grounded in politica
l 
economy. In other words, natural resource bonan~as and abundant capit
al 
·~nflows not only render the exchange rate str~ng but.they also exert a
 
politico/psychological effect making it not only feasible for the sys
tem 
to continue to afford heavy protectionism and the relatively inefficie
nt 
growth path chosen but, in fact, politically.difficu).t to deviate from
 
~t. It is increasingly well understood tha~ a shift from PIS to PES 
must overcome the resistance of industrialists, reluctant to shift fro
m 
certain, large unit profit rates on a small volume in domestic markets
 
to uncertain smaller unit profit rates ori_a larger volume in export 
markets; the _resistance of ·the civil service threatened with a reducti
on 
of its i~fluence or power as controls are reduced; and, finally, it 
flies in the face of much·of organized labor's tendency, especially in 
the Latin American case, to keep its eye on wage rates ra~her than the
 
wage bill and the income of working families. In fact, there is incre
as­
ing recognition that the feasibility of effective policy change depends 
111Uch more heavily on the capacity to forge viable political coalitions 
inside developing societies-with the proper orchestra~ion or muting 
of foreign influence-than in deriving the.technocratically "perfect" 
package. 
Thus, a country like Mexico, given the relative abundance of her 
natural resources and access to foreign capital could not only afford 
-26-
to "pay" for the prol~:mgation of import substitution and attempt to 
"skip" the primary export substitution subphase but also found it 
politically infinitely easier to do· so. In a•situation of deeply 
-· encrusted habits and strong vested interests a society can move further 
·•and further away from its comparative advantage position; it can try. 
to raise industrial wages even in the presence of substantial unemploy­
ment; and it can import food even in the presence of potential "bargains" 
in the agricultural sector. Until very recently Mexico thought she 
could "afford" the relatively costly.choice of an SIS/EP growth path 
.. . . 
in the belief that her natural resources were plentif_ul enough, foreign 
capitalists responsive enough and the employment/ distributional out­
comes tolerable enough. Unfortunately there now exists considerable 
do~bt, certainly with respect to the seco~d of thes·e assumptions. · 
The East Asian cases, including our representative, Taiwan, on 
. . 
the other hand, did not have the same options from the outset. While 
the agricultural sector couid be viewed as a temporary, if important, 
source of fuel, the system's long run comparative advantage had to be 
i.e. first in its human resources, and now increasinglysought elsewhere 1 
via the contribution of routinized science and technology as during 
the epoc~ of modern growth. The secula:-shortage ·of patural resources, 
h particular, and the unwillingness of £~reign capital to support 
continued import substitution in a relatively small domestic market 
context forced an early change in policy towards the utilization of 
·b~n resources and away from land based resources· and. once a more 
market oriented·~rowth pattern_ ~ad been established,it began to have 
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its own modus operandi, i.e. one of f
lexibility, responsiveness to 
changing endowment conditions and a cha
nging.international environment • 
. -
IV. Prospects 
The contemporary typological approach
 to development, whether it 
• has its origins in a cross sectional
 or a compara~ive historical approach
,, 
by now fully embraces the notion that e
conomic.history, especially that 
of the developing world since the Sec
ond World War, represents a still 
much underutilized laboratory for analy
zing contemporary development 
~ssues. Differences, of course, remai
n with respect-to the appropriate-
ness 
. . 
of the tools to be deployed in that lab
oratory. Individual case 
studies often lack the requisite statis
tical underpinning for generaliza­
~ility,and regressions using pooled t
ime series and cross-sectionai 
,How systems are best
data often lack sufficient behayioral ins
ight. 
sectored, if at all, as between smooth 
input~output disaggregations 
and an emphasis on the possibly mean
ingful heterogeneity of sectoral 
organizational as well as product mix
 contexo;,also remains controversial
. 
Some basic ideas, however, seem to ha
ve em~rged ~hich provide 
some cement. and beckon to be built o
n further. One is the more precise 
definition of the Kuzne·tsian notion o
f modeP1 growth and how it is to 
be achieved; a second builds on the ident
ifi~ation of meaningful country 
types in terms of the initial conditio
ns as well as the policy setting 
over time; a third introduces the notion o
f the necessary rules of 
transition between any two subphases 
as the modus operandi of the 
system is substanti~lly altered; a fo
urth insists that,~tbatever sectoral 
or sub-sectoral disaggregation is made and
 differential ·assumptions 
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introduced, we are interested in .the retention of a holistic view, i.e. 
of wanting to better understand a system's total performance at the end 
of the day. 
and Syrquin 
We are more and more agreed on aims. As Chenerylput it (in Patterns 
of Development,1975, p. 3),
1 it is to identify "uniform features of develop­
" ment, to provide a consistent· description of a nu{Dber of interrelated 
types of structural change and also to iden~ify systematic differences 
in development patterns." The_comparatiYe historical approach has found 
. .
it useful to look at major "successful" cases of economic development, 
for example Japan and the contemporary East.Asia~ c~untries, to contrast.
them with less "successful" types, and has tended to define "success" 
as the exhaustion of the countries' labor surplus O't' the advent of modern 
growth. The pooled time series and cross-sectional school has segmented 
.. a much larger LDC _sample by population size, natural resource endowment 
and the pre-existing structure of production ~nd trade in the effort to 
asses~ the proximate determinants of good versus inferior performance. 
While one approach is more casual, the other more econometric, one more 
normative, the other more positive, it is perhaps most useful to ask 
where we are (jointly)· likely to go from here in putting all our machinery 
tovork most ef.fectively. 
One·obvious point of emergi;ng agreement is that \lhenever an individual 
country has been identified as deviating from the average historical
.. 
pattern such a case should be explored in ~ more fundamental, "deeper" 
fashion, perhaps, but not necessarily~via the comparativ, historical 
approach illustrated in this paper. In this sense the "average pattern" 
becomes the beginning of visd0t11 and needs to be supplemented by a more 
1Pr• ctt. 
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•ystematic ~odelling approach in the comparative
 historical tradition. 
The industrial development pattern, for ·example, for 
all LDCs (see 
figure 2, taken from Chenery and Syrquin) could be r
elated to Taiwans 
.po~ticular industrial development pattern between 19
50 and 1975 as indi­
cated by .the dotted line in the same figure. Perhap
s even more suggestive 
·would be a compnrison of the same Taiwan industria
lization pattern with 
what Chenery and Taylor called their "small industry
 oriented" subset 
of countries in·figure 3 and.perhaps most p+oductive
, at a 111or~ disaggre­
sated level of industrial. activity~ an examination o
f the Taiwan_ pattern 
c~n~rasted with the overall small industry-oriented-
country pattern, as 
abown iP figure 4. Such analysis would provide the fir
st step towards 
• ~ieher and simultaneously tighter explanation of obs
e-rved deviations,
. 
&specially th~se associated with more successfu
l develop::ent performance 
&tDong otherwise similarly placed countries.· 
lu this conte~t it also becomes incumbent on the com
parative his­
toi-ical ~ch~ol to fil.l in more of. the 
11 type>logical space~
11 between such 
relatively e~treme case~ as Taiwan, on the one hand
. and Mexico, on the
.
other. A cotnpat"ati:ve examination of the development
 experience of Malaysia 
iu Asi.1.1, -Peru in Latin America as well as of some of
 the semi-indus;rializ_ed 




Spain and Portugal might 
It also needs to become more preciseprove very useful in this context. 
about the role of initial conditions, si~e. man/land
 ratios. natural 
rosou-rce endowments., human capital. as veil as, poss
ibly sub~erged. cul­
blt'al differet'ees, 
2 as well as in modelling the transitiO'O. between 
su.bphases 
and the availability of policy options over time
. 
1Generali~ing our 0'4l'n approach in this fashion v.1
s actually explicitly 
ausgestcd by Chcncry in his "Comments on 'Challe
nges and ·Opportunities Pos:?d 
by Asia's Super-Exporters: Implications for ~nufac
tured Exports from Latin 
America" in Export Diversification and the N•:!W P
rotectionis!ll edited by W. Baer 
.
and lt. Cillis, NoC:R. 191:H. 
2id~ittedly usually neglected. including in th~s paper. 
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Secondly, it is our conviction that both· aforementioned approaches 
have been too exclusively trade oriented to date. In fact, in our view, 
and in some ·contrast with the theoretical literature, this has been a 
problem with too much of the empirically oriented work in development 
over ~he.past 20 years. Chenery's countries, for example, are said to 
be experiencing "balancE;d development" when their trade, production 
orientation and level of exports are sufficiently close _to the "average," 
but there is no implication that such "balance" has any normative mean­
ing in terms of any of the many definitions of the term in the develop­
ment literature. Not only trade but also foreign c~pital, public and 
private, as well as foreign technology, of course, needs to be accom­
modated within an integrated open economy framew~rk. But if we indeed 
agree to accept "success".as an.important selection criterion for our 
research and policy strategy it seems clear .• moreover, that a second 
crucial blade ·of any successful development strategy is almost invariably 
the mobilization of the LDC's domestic economy, agricult~ral and non-
.agricultural, often largely rural, in a balanced growth fashion. 
This is very tn11ch emphasized in the early work of Arthur Lewis as well as 
·1n Fei and Ranis but has been given relatively short shrift in the more L I 
casually empirical open· economy versions of-these models. Chenery and 
associat~s similarly have focussed heavily Qn the trade and foreign capital aspect 
1 ,of structure and growth and much less, at least until recently on.the dynamics.. 
of alternative internal inter-sectoral patterns of development. In 
fact much of the work of recent years including that of Little. Scitovsky 
and Scott, Bhagwati, Krueger, Balassa and their associates has focussed 
. . 
on development phases heavily influenced by trade policies, \Jhich is 
1see H.B. Chenery, Structural Chan~e and-Development Policy, Oxford . 
lJni~ersity Press, 1979. 
-31-
all well and good; but almost invariably the impor
tance of the initial 
distribution of land, of the provision of ru
ral infrastructure, of the 
• 
dimensions of how well appropriate technolqgy
-and appropriate goods 
. 
_options. have been disseminated through the h
interland of even small 
As Kravis has pointed
countries, has been· given inadequate attention.
 
· out,1 ·"export expansion did not serve in the n
ineteel\th century to 
We believe
differentiate success.ful from unsuccessful c
ountries." 
that a similar righting of the "engine" versus "hand-maiden" balance
 
1.s still required with respect to the interp
retation of post World 
This is a point esp~cially valid.forWa~ ~I development experience. 
the la~ge countries of Asia and Latin America b
ut even a system like 
. Kenya, not so large but with a very substan
tial agricultural hinter-
·. . 
land, needs to pay m.ich more attention to the cond
itions for successful 
agricultural, along with rural industrial p
roductivity increase, for instance, than 
e.itheT of the main approaches discussed at l~ngth in this paper have tende
d to thus fa 
As we h~ve noted in our description of _the_Taiwan c
ase, 




auch of the ultimate success must be placed a
t the doorstep of the 
ability to generate successful balanced growth 
in the rural areas as 
.part of the triangul~r pattern of absorbing th
e labor surplus and 
"shipping it out" in the context of an overa
l_l satisfactory agricul­
It is this second blade of an overalltu.~a1 and rural performance. 
successful development effort, including the im
portance of appropriate 
goods as well as the harnessing of appropri
ate technology. which needs· 
to be nore fully inc_orporated into future m
odelling efforts. 
· · 1irvtng B. Kravis, "Trade as the Ha~d-Mai
den of Growth: Similarities 
letveen the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centur
ies," Economic Journal, December 
1970•• p. 650. 
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Thirdly, given the fact that failure seems to have too many causes, 
if not parents, the profession overall has perhaps paid too much attention 
to the "success" cases. Chenery' s positive approach indeed weighS all 
to the primary.countries as equally important and has recently pointed ~s 
specialization strategy of special potential in the African context. It 
~s undoubtedly important to more fully examine typ~logical groupings of 
comparative historical experiences on either side of the average, thus 
rendering the historical approach less normative.and enriching the field 
of inquiry. In that context the conceptual development of subphasing 
which adds domestic parameters to the dominant f orei.gn trade dimensions 
of the comparative historical approach demonstrated in Section III 
some'Clould be an-important ingredient. This, in turn would require 
accommodatio~ between the emphasis on pure per capita income change 
· of the ''homogeneous" sector,neo..-classical school and the meaningful acceptance of 
tuming points vi.thin the "heterogeneous" se~tor structuralist approach. 
While th~re_ is no unique or inevitable tra?sjtion growth path for any 
. 
type of LDC-just as there is no meaningfully average behavior pattern-
a good ?eal of room exists for innovative modelling here, in order to 
test the·notion of endogenously determined subphases within a more rigor-
,ously specified econometric context. 
,..· 
Figure 1 
Comparative Subphases of Development 
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• 1950-1970, London: Oxford University Press, p. 36. 
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Mineral/fuel /otherSize (population Labor Surplus (man/ Human capital 
in thousands) arable land ratio resources natural resources 
in hectares) (literacy rate) 
.
8,017 (1960) 3.9 (1=960) . 20% (1962) moderate (no coal
or oil) but good in 
cash crops) 
16,589 (1930) o. 7 (1930) 39% (1930) rich (zinc, lead,
copper, silver, iron
ore, mercury, sulphur/ 
oil reserves among
largest in world) 
7,981 (1950) 9.2 (1950) . 50% (1950) poor (good coal,
some natural gas,
little oil) 
UN Demographic Yearbook (size), FAO Production Yearbook (arable land), 





Primary Import Substitution (MCN 
/M) 8 





Mexico S.8 4.3 
s.1 
2.9
Taiwan 17.2 (53)b 
5.8 
Sources: UN Yearbook of Internationai
 Trade Statistics 
8 Consumer.nondurable tndustries = 61 le
ather, etc. 64 paper, 
paper board, etc., 65 textiles, 84 clo
thing, 851 footwear, 
892 printed matter. 
.b
Computation not_completely comparable 
t"o others due.to lack 
of SIC data. 
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Table 3 
Kenya: Statistical Indicators 
195Q 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per Capita o. 7 :-1.2 4.9 i.7 1.7 -2.3 1.2 3.6 
GNP Growth Rate(%) 
(2) 8--% Non-agricultural 16.0 17.9 20.1 20.5 21.0 
Labor 
(3) Savings/GNP 14.3 12.-s 1s.3 15.3 23.4 12.8 19.1 23.4 
(4) Investment/GNP 20.4 14.8 25.3 2L2 29.. 7 20.3· 21.1. 22.0 
.64(S) Gini Coefficient 
(69)' 
3.9.- (6) Income % of Bottom 20% 
(69) 
(7) Agricultural 86.6 77.2 · 74.8 75.9 66.8 63.1 61.4 
Exports as% of (61) 
Total Exports 
· (8) Mineral Exports 1.4 13.0 12.4 11.1 20.3 23.4 23.4 18.5 
. as X of Total Expo:-ts (61) 
(9) Manufactured Exports 11.7 9.7 12.4 12.6 12.8 13.1 · 15.0 9.7 
as % of Total (61) 
Exports 
(10) Annual Total Export 9.2 s.2 7.6 · . 4.4 18.3 -13.0 5.4 -0.7 
Growth Rate(%) 




Mexico: Statistical Indicators 
1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 19771950 1960 1965 
3.4 2.1 1.0 -1.0(1) Annual Real Per Capita 6.2 3.5 2.5 
GNP Growth Rate (%) . 
S9:·5 60.4 61.3






. 1.2 12.5 11.6 13.l 19.4
(3) Savings/ GDP . 10.0 6.4
 1.0 
~ 
-· - .. 
22.4 23.4 24.7 24.6 23.015.7 18.3 18;9 21.3(4) .Investme!J.t/ GDP . ... --- - .--·----· .... ···-·--- .... ·-. --·-•·- ·- -- ···-- . - ... - .. 




(6) Income % of :Bottom 20% (63) (69) 
53.5 64.1 64.7 48.8 42.6 40.8 38.l 
42.1
0) Agricultural
Exports as% of· 
7otal Exports-· • . 
·(8) Minera1 Exports 38.6 . 24.0 22.3 21.2 16.5 23.l 
32.4 30.3 
as % of Tottl Exports-· 
11.9 13.0 30.0 40.8 36~0 29.5· 27.5· (9) Manufactured Exports 7.9
.as % of Total
Exports 
(10) .,~~l· Total Export 5.9 1.1 9.3 · 7.9 -12.0 ·20.s 24.6 
Growth .Rate (%) 
0.9 
... .. . I • 











Taiwan: Statistical Indicators • 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
(1) Annual Real Per C~pita 3.6 5.1 6.2 -1.1 0.9 9.8 6.8 
-Gh7 Growth Rate (%) · (51-60) 
. . -. 
.(2) 8 -% Non-agricultural 37. 3 43.9 ~6.3 55.6 -~2.8 .. 63.l 63.4 65.4 66.2 
• • • • • .. • '!" •• • • • •••· ·tabor 
-(3) Savings/GNP· 10~3 12.0 14.9 20. 7 27 .4 24 .8 19 .8 24.3 24.l 
. . 
12.2 - 17.6 18.0 23.5 28._3 31.l 32.7 30.7 29.1 
(S) Gini Coefficient .56 .44 --...•29 
-• . : ..- .• "(S9) . (72) 
· (6). Incor.1e % of !ottO!il._ 20% • 2.9 5.6 7.8 8.8 
. (53) . (64) (72) 
s1.7 57 .9 · _ 22.5 is.·8 15.5 17.5 13.6 13.4.· (7) J.grlcultural 
.· ·. (62). · Experts · as % of· 
• ,. -~otal ~--cnorts. . 
. 2.1 0.4 0.7- · · 0.3 · . 0.3 -1.l · 1.3~ ,.-(8) Mineral Exports -- . -
(62)· . - as_% of ·rotal Exports . ... 
. (9) Manufactured Exports 46.2 41.7 76.8 83.9 84.2 81
.4 85.0 84.9 
.. (6.2)· as % of Total ·. . . . .. • · ·Exports -. .. . . . . ........ - .. 
. . . . .·,.s- 22.2 .. 23.7 31.6 -10.9: • I ••(10) Annual Total Exp:>rt .. .-Growth Rate (%) ... •. .. ...\. .. . : .... ~ . ~- . .... .............. . . - .. ..- . 
.-. . .....•
10.1 n.1 18.4 29.6 49.o 45.4 41.2 52.3 53.s 
(51) . . . 
- . - -- . --:~·:·· ---_ ·..~- -··• - . -
. . . • ......··-







Calculated from indices 




on Sales No. E/.F.79.>..'V
ll.1) pp.. 698-702. 
Befers to compound annual
 growth of real GNP. 
Calculated from populat
ion estimates in FAO, ·P
roduction Yearbooks, 
2) 
1966, 1970, and 1977 (Rome
, Italy: Statistics Divi
sion, FAO) Table 3. 
Savings from UN ·National
 Accounts Yearbook, _1978
, (United Nations 
3) 
Publication Sales No. E.
79.XVII.8,Vol. I); GDP fr
o:n IMF Yearbook 
·of International Financia
l Statistics. 
4) W Yearbook of Natio
nal Accounts Statistics,
 1978. 
Jain, Shail, Size Distribu
tion of Income, {Washingt
on, D.C.: The 
All data are for total 
population.
World Bank, 197.5). 
6) Ibid.-
ment Statistics, 1979 (Un
ited Nations Publication
 Sales No. E/F.79.II.D.
2). 
Ag~cultural e1:ports are d
efined as SIT~ o+l+2-27-28
+4; mineral exports 
are defined as SITC 27+28+3+
67+68; and manufactured e
xports are 
7)-9) 1970-77. statistics ar
e from UNCTAD, Yearbook of 
Trade and Develop~ 
_
defined as SITC 5+6-67-68+
7+8. 19.50-65 data are cal
culated from UN 
Yearbook of Internationa
l Trade Statistic·s for t
he appropriate year. 
19) Calculate?d from IMF, Y
earbook, converted t:o re




 Yearbook. Export values
 a.re fTom the· national 
accounts and i.nclude goods





·1) · Calculated from IM! Y
earbook. 
2) ·Calculated from, Sta
tistical Yearbook of the
 Republic of China, 
(Taipei: Directorate Gen
eral of Budget, Accountin
g and Statistics, 
1978). 
~ational Income of the R
epublic of China (Taipei
: Directorate General 
3) 
of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, 1977). 
. . . . 
7) Statistical Yearbook of the Renublic of China, 1978, SITC.o+l+2+4, 
PP• 252-3. , • 
8) Ibid., SITC 3.-· 
9) Ibid., SITC 5+6+7+8+9.-
KENYA 
. 
1), 3), 4) 10), 11) Calculated from World Ban.~, World Tables. 1980 • 
• 
. .-·•_ .• .,. ... 
• 
• 
• 
